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THESIS ABSTRACT 
The problem which this thesis proposes to treet is Immenuel 
Kent's ettempt to frame en ethical system ultimately based on the 
postuleta of' moral freedom (i.e. morel eutonomy), and et the same 
time to espouse whet he describes as the doctrine of "radical innete 
evil in human neture." While the exeminetion may well have signif'icant 
implications for moral end religious theories beyond the boundaries 
of' Kentien thought., generelly these tempting vistas ere not explorgd 
in the thesis. In.deed, the issue may also have broad repercussions 
fer Kent •s phllo:!!ophy in genet'fll but this too lies beyond the scope 
of the thesis. The investiga Hon is limited es much es possible to 
the presentation and ~nslysis or Kent's specific argument for moral 
auto .nomy end radicel evil as it is found in his t1110 major ethical 
works ~ritigue of Practical Reason and The fundamental Princioles o[ 
tl-t~ !Yle_taohysi.c of Ethics, as well es his religious tree tise, B.£.LJ.gio_n_ 
lll,ithin the pmits of Reascin ~lone. However, the major interpretations 
cf Kent's doctrines of mo1'8l eutcnomy end radk~l av!l e!'e examined 
in some detail since the derinition of these terms !s crucial ror 
any ex~rnination of their cc~patibility. 
The first ~action of the thesis, "moral Autonomy" consists of 
o presontation end analysis of som3 of the moro proo1inent and 
differing lnterpratations of Kant•s notion of moral eutonomy. 
Prim3rily, the section deals with the views of Hens Vaihinger, w. T. 
Jon~s, John R. Silber, and Lewis White Beck. Both the "fraadom es 
•iv-
fiction" interprete ti on or Vaihing~r and the "freedom as personality 
fulfillment" interpretation of Jones ere rejected as not accurately 
representing Kant's 0v.tn viN of' moral autonc1ny. The • freedom as 
spontaneity" interpretation of Silber is endorsed, but it is also 
suggested that a full understanding of moral autonOffly requires the 
additional insights of Beck with respect to the distinction between 
"freedom es spontenei ty" end "freedom as autonomy." The interpreta-
tion of moral autonomy upon which the balance of the thesis is 
constructed is, therefore, e combination of the viems of Silber and 
Beck. 
The second section of the thesis, "Radice! Evil,• contains 
a systematic presentation of' Kant's doctrine of "redical innate evil 
in human neture." There is much less controversy concerning the 
definition of this term than surrounds the definition of "moral 
autonomy." This is probably due to the fact that the only place 
where Kent fully treats this doctrine is in the Religion !Ind his 
discussion of it there is thorough end reasonably straightforward. 
The final secUon is en enalysis of the compatibility of these 
two Kantian doctrines. first, it is argued that Kant was very well 
aware of the danger of contradicting his fundamental ethical postulate 
of morel eutonomy in affirming the doctrine of radical evil. Second, 
due to his cognizance of this danger, he carefully and successfully 
defined redicel evil in such a way the t it does not contradict moral 
autonomy. Third, the compatibility of these two doctrines in Kent's 
philosophy may not ultimately bee s5tisfactory resolution of the 
general p~oblem of affirming that ll'l!ln is both morally responsible end 
111orally depraved because t<ant·'-s understanding of radical evil is 
dubious. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The long evolution of philosophical thought has been influenced 
end sheped by a multiplicity or creative minds. Among this multiplicity, 
h0111ever, a few philosophers enjoy e place of particular prominence 
ocing to their overtly significant contributions to the development 
of philosophical inquiry. Immanuel Kent occupies such e position. 
His philosophy, along with that of Plato and Aristotle, stands among 
the most influential both in clarifying perennial philosophical problems 
end providing direction for future philosophical investigation. "ihis 
thesis will concern itself with one aspect or Kant's rich philosophy, 
namely his attempt to construct an ethical system ultimately based 
on the postulate of moral autonomy, and at the same time to affirm 
e doctrine of "radical innate evil in humen nature." The issue of 
man's moral freedom ha8 been a topic of enduring debate among both 
philosophers and theologians, end its complexity has been compounded 
in the case of those who would wish to affirm not ~nly that man is 
morally fraa but else that he is innately morally corrupt. many 
scholars have rather lightly dismissed this latter position es being 
obviously contradictory, end yet such a dismissal becomes more 
difficult when a philosoph -er of the stature of Immanuel Kant is the 
proponent. The purpose of this thesis, is, therefore, to examine Kan~s 
case for the compatibility of moral autonomy end radical evil. 
~ith respect to Kant's writings, the examination will be drawn 
primarily from his two major ethical works, The Fundamental Principles 
of the Metaphysic of Ethics end the Critiaue of Practical Reason, es 
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well a~ from Kent•9 religious t r e~tise 1 R~l!gion Within the Limits 
of Reason Alon~. The first section cf the thesis will assess some 
or the more significant interpretations or Kent's understanding of 
•oral eutonomy. The second section •ill sy~tematically present Kent's 
doctrine of redical evil es ~ent, himself, erticulated it in the 
B~llgion. Then, given the definition of these two terms the fine! 
~ection will attempt to evaluate their competibility. 
Although Kent wished to maintain e distinction between ethics 
end religion, h~ also recognized their interrelatedness. His comments 
concArning red!cel evil in the Religign_, therefore, provide e helpful 
elucidation of the strictly ethiCfll consideretions which he undertook 
in the met!lphysic of Ethic~ end the Cri. tigue ,of' Prac.tical Reason. 
In much the same way, then, although the purpose of this thesis is 
to preser.t e treatment of one spscific issue (i.e. th9 compatibility 
or Kantian radical evil and moral autonomy) it is hoped that in this 
process, other concerns both within Kant's philosophy end beyond it 
will be highlighted. The consideration of these other issues, however, 
lies beyond the scope of this work, and therefore must be left unattended. 
Nevertheless, perh~ps even thsse un~ttendad questions, mhich ere 
implicit in the particular issue before u~, will be seen in e new 
light and will therefcra receive the attention due to them on another 
occeision. 
I. ~ORAL AUTONDmY 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Kantian undarstending 
or .morel eutonomy 111ust be exp lice ted prior to the t:rea tment of' the 
specific problem with which this thesis is concerned (I.e. the apparent 
contradiction in K3nt • !S concurrently a t'f'irming th!! notions of' moral 
freedom end innate, radical evil). However, the !~sue of' how Kent 
understood the term "moral autonomy" must itself be viewed within 
the context of Kant's discussion or another epperent contradictions 
namely, the contradiction between moral freedom and natural law. 
Kant presumably held both "(1) that 'every action that takes place 
et e certein point of time is a necessary result of mh~t existed 
in time preceding,' end so is completely conditioned in accordance 
with the general principle of causality, end (ii) that we ere bound 
1 to do only ~hat we ere free to do." In working towards a Kantian 
definition of moral freedom, therefore, me must keep before us the 
feet that Kant sought to define this freedom in such a wey that it 
did not ccntredict natural necessity and men•~ plece as a "ohenomenon" 
within the na tur~l order nor man's dignity es a moral ngent. The 
tesk of this section is r.ot to critically assess ~ant's definition 
or moral eutonomy. Rather, we shall attempt to discover and explain 
Kant's defini Hon as 1 t is presented primarily in the .Ll!fillarr.enl:al 
Pring_ples or the l'l1et1'physic of Ethics end the £1:.liia:Je of Prac_~ical 
1 
Williem Thomzs Jones, MoJ~jity and Fre edom in the Phil..Q.gophy 
9f Immanuel Kant (Oxford University Press, 1940), P• 1. 
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Reason. In order to do this, it is necessary to consider several 
significant interpretations of Kant's 'Jse of tha term 'moral autonomy' 
before one of these interpretations can be endorsed or a new one 
given. The three major interpretations which we shall consider are 
(1) Hans Vaihinger•s theory of "moral freedom as fiction," 2 (2) w. T. 
Jones' theory of "mcral freedom es personality fulfillment," 3 (3) John 
R. Silber's theory of "moral freedom as spontaneity."4 
In The Phil os ophy of 'As If' Hens Vaihinger presents his argument 
on behalf of the •rreedom as fiction" interpretation. He begins by 
quoting from Kent •s The Fundamental Principles of the Metaohvsic ·of 
Ethics: 
Now I says Everything that cannot ect otherwise 
than •under the idea of freedom" is therefore in practical 
respects reall y free, that is to say, for him ell the laws 
count which ere inseparably connected with freedom, as if 
his will were o f itself declared to be free end indeed by 
e proof accept ab le in theoretical philo s cphy. 
Now I maintain thet to ea~h being who has e will 
we mu~t necessa r ily also ettrib~te the idea of freedom by 
which elone he acts. for in such e being we conceive e 
reesort that is p·r.icticel, the t has caus-ali ty in reference 
to its objects. It is impossible to conceive e reason that 
in full conscic m sness would be directed in respect to its 
judgments by s o~e outside source, for than the subject would 
ascribe the determination of his judgment not to reason, 
but to some impulsion. Reason must look upon itsalf es the 
originator of it s principles, independent of foreign 
influen ce s. Cons equently it mus t, es practical reason or 
will of a rati nnal being, conceive itself as frea, that is 
to say, its 1111.11 cen be e will of its 011n only und!!r the 
2Hans Va!hi nge r, Jhe Philo so phy of 'As If', trans. by c. K. Ogden 
(New Yorks Harcou rt , Brace, & Co., Inc., 1924). 
3w. T. Jone s , ~ity and Freedom. 
4John R. Si l ber, " The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," 
in the Intro. to I m nanue l Kent, Reli gion Wi thi n th e li mit s of ~ eason 
~lor)_t,i, trrin s . by The odore m. Greene and Hoyt H. Huds on ( Nell: Yorki 
Harper & Row Publi she rs, 196 0). 
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idee of freedom., and this idea !l,ust therefore in every 
practical respect be ettributed to ell rational being9.S 
Veihlnger ta~es this passege •es s cle~r statement or Kent 1 9 
•fictional view" of moral freedom for he (Ve!hinger) •rite5 "• •• 
here Kent cleerly end unembigiously decleres freed0111 to be but e mere 
!dee without reelity." 5 It must not be essumed, however, thet 
Veihinger thought he wes pointing out a deficiency in Kant's morel 
philosophy. Nor does Vaihinger suggest that Kent •es unaware of this 
interpretation. Indeed, V2ihinger apperently believed not only that 
Kent conseiously espoused this view of freedom es fiction but elso 
thet Kent saw it as en acceptable resolution of the apparent contradic-
tion between netural lew end morel autonomy. Veihin g'Sr insists "Here 
me reach the highest pinnacle ettained by Kantian thought, or indeed, 
by eny humen thought. Only e few, only en elite, can continue to 
breethe et all at this eltitude: the vest majority need e different, 
e less rersfied etmosphere." 7 
A closer inspecti :OIJ of the pessege which Veihingar quotes, 
hOU1ever, fails to lend strong support to either of Vaihinger's 
conclusions. First, it is not clear that Kant is s bt ing or even imply-
ing that moral freedom is ultimately fictitious. Kaot simply says, 
••• Everything that cannot act oth e ·rwi sa than 
"under tho idea of fre e do m" is therefore in prac t ical 
respects really fr ee ••• 
Reason must look upon itself as the ori ginator of 
its principles, ind ependent of foreign influence s . Consequently 
5 I m<nBnuel Kent, Th<.? Fund ame nt a l Ptl.D£1,.PJes of t he Me taph ys _ig_ 
of EJ;hj.~ , tr ans . by Otto Manth ey-Zorn ( New York: Appl e ton-Cant ury-
Crofts, Inc., 1938), P• 67. 
6vaihingers ~As If,' P• 289. 
7Ibl d ., P• 293. 
it must, es pr:!lcttcal raason ot ,,,dll cf e rational being, 
conceive itself es free •••• u 
In other words, man e5 a I'!!tional beinq must v!e~ himselr es 
free (i.e. act "under the !dee of' freedOffl") end t:herercre 19 practically 
free. But this doos not necesserily mean that men is not ectuelly free 
both prect!cally and thao ,retically. Rether, it simply states that 
even if men were not theorgticelly f~ee (i.e. ultii,,ately free) he 
would still be morally responsible, " ••• for him '!ll the laws count 
•hi .ch ere inseper!!bly connected 111th freedom. 119 Therefora, Kant is 
willing to rare go the question or man's theoretical freedom on the 
grrunds that its re~olutlon le not essential to the task before him. 
Indeed, he explicitly states this in a note to the very passage 
which Valhinger quotes. 
I em adopting this method or assuming as sufficient 
for our purpose that freedom is merely "as an idea" made the 
bests of ell actions of rationel beings, so that I moy be 
relieved or the necessity of proving freedom in its thecre-
ticel respect also. For even when the ietter i3 left 
undone, then for the being who cannot act otherwise than 
under the idea of his own freedom the se18 laws still apply 
which would bind en actually rree being. 
Thus Kant •as net suggesting that morel freedom is e fiction, 
but only thet moral resp onsibility does not require the theoretical 
proof of freedom ■ Indeed, other passeges, both in the Met~physlc of 
Ethics and th,;, Critique of Practical Reason rnl!lke it clear that Kant 
did not consider freedom to be fictitious. ~ant statess 
••• it is en indispensable tesk of speculative 
philosophy to point out that the deception regarding this 
contradiction (between netural necessity end freedom) rests 
upon the ract that whsn we call e man free we think of 




him !n enoth~r sense 9nd in a diffor~ nt relation then mhen 
me consider him as part of nature end subje~t to its lews. 
It must point out also the t the two not only can go together 
very well, but must be recerded as necessarily unitad in 
11 the seme subject •••• 
And in the C~itigue of Practical Reason, "Speculative ree · Jn 
does not herewith grow in insight but only in respect to the certitude 
of its problematic concept of freedom, to which objective, though 
only practicel, reality is now indubitably given. 11 , 2 It is certainly 
true that for Kent moral freedom has e different epishmologieal 
status then the concept of r.ature (i.e. natural law) which "proves 
13 end necessarily must prove its reality in examples of experience." 
Howaver, this is not to say that freedom ls e fiction but only that 
its significance is primerily practical rather then speculative. for 
Vaihinger's interpretation to stlrnd, it would have to be demonstrated 
that Kent equated the objective Bnd the prectical with the fictional, 
end tc my knowledge no ,;uch equation is ever made in Kant's wri tlngs. 
Indeed, such en equation seem~ to be antithetical to the whole thrust 
of Kent's ethic~. As w. T. Jones phrases its 
••• to call a bF.lief e fiction is to say that 
whet is believed is not the cas9 ••• Kant's whole inquiry 
mes designed to explain the possibility of freedom and 
thereby to establish that obligation is an objective 
feet and not an illusion; and it is impossible to believa 
thet Kant could have accepted es satisfactory the conclusion 
thet it (freedom) is a false hypothesi3 to which nothing cor-
responds in ract. 14 
11 Ibid., P• 76. 
12 Immenuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis 
,i.1hite Beck (New Yorks The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1956), P• SO. 
13Kent, metag~ic or Ethics, p. 76. 
14w. r. Jones, ~lity end freedom, PP• 44-~5. 
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It would saem, then, t~at neithsr the "lstter• nor the "spirit" 
or tcent•s 11Htings tend to support Veihinger's conclusi rPf\ that Kent 
98■ •oral freedom as e useful fiction. It may be that such e vie• 
would resolve the contr8diction between netur8l lew end freedo~. But, 
it would do so on terms uneccepteble to Kant because it would forfeit 
the ~orel dignity of men by reducing morel obligation to en illusion. 
w. T. Jones suggests another interpretetion of Kent's view or 
■orel freedom in his book Mortili ty end F"raedom In the Philosophy of 
15 -
Jl!llll9nuel Kent. Jones' entire discussion of morel freedom pivots 
around the problem already referred to or understanding freedom in 
euch~e way that it satisfies the following criteria& "(1) compatibility 
with the principle of causality es laid down in The Critique of Pure 
Reason, end (ii) compatibility with the reality of morality end of 
16 
obligation." F"urthermore, Jones openly admits that the "Kantian" 
view of morel freedom for which he ergues ls no·t "Kantian 11 in the 
sense that it is the only interpretation which Kant explicitly 
affirmed, but only in the senses 
(i) that this "critical" theory was in feet held by 
Kent ( together, h0tuever, with other theur!es from which he 
seems never to have distinguished it); (ii) thet it satisfies 
Kent's own "Pr.obl emstellung," while these other theories do 
notJ (iii) thet it goes e long wey towards bein~ en adequate 
solution to our own conception of the problom. 1 
Jones begins his articulation of Kant's "criticel" theory ·by 
e discussion of the 11noumena/phen.9 mena" distinction. Jone-s rejects 
the notion that noumena can be causally efficecious in the phenomenel 
world on the grounds that this would contradict natural necessity and 
15 




thereby preserve the reeli ty of mcrr.1 otiligation et the uneccepteble 
cost of denying the principle of ceusality.
18 
Jones willingly edmits 
that et times Kent himeelf thought that. nouman~l causality wes the 
key to en eccepteble resolution of the entlnomy between freedom end 
nature! lew. However, Jones insists that this view feils to setisfy 
either of his final two criterieJ the satisfaction of Kent's own 
"Problemstellung" or the solution to our present view of the problem. 
The best wey to pre~ent Jones' argument is to quote it, 
Let us suppose, in eccordence with Kent's thesis, 
that a, b, end care the entecedent events which condition 
the occurrence of e certain act P• Now if one certain 
occasion, efter the occurrence of a, b, e, the agent does q, 
wh8t we assume, and what Kant himself essumes, is simply 
thet some factor x has also occurred, that xis another 
event, et the moment unknown, end that a, b, c, x, conditions 
the occurrence of Q• If we did not make this assumption, it 
would obviously be in principle impossible to pradict human 
conduct with cert2inty, end we should have to abandon the 
thesis, on which Kant insists, that ell events happen in 
accordance with unchangeable laws. 
It is clear, moreover, not only that this essumption 
leaves no placa for the hypothesis that there hes been e 
manifestation of noumenel causality, but that the hypothesis 
itself is really meeningless. For, if q is noumenally caused, 
th~n x, the factor in the situation which brings it about 
thet q rather than p occurs, is non-temporal. Therefore, 
though q is en event an d occurs, there is no time et which 
x happens. But whether q happens or not is supposed to 
depend on whether or not x ex erts its efficacious power, 
end this is really meaningless ■ It is quite impossible to 
attach any significance to the idea of x and q varying 
concomitantly where x does not "arise or begin et e certain 
time ■" 
••• Hence, on Kant's own terms, there seems but 
one conclusion to drsis that noumene a6e not causally 
efficacious tlli th re spect to phenomena. 1 
After rejecting the ceusel efficacy of noumena, Jones goes on 
to develop his intarpretation of morel eutonomy by considering tho 
"will" not es e "spontaneous exercise of noumenal coussllty" but es 
---------- -~ 
18Ibid., P• 4 snd following. 
19Ibid. PP• 7-8. -- ' 
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• causal, phencmenel, psychicl!l eve,.,t. The p!!yehici,l emphedzes the 
•il!'s cogniti~e power. Tha C!!Usal espect extends the definiton or 
•ill beyond the merely eognitivs. "Practieel reeson ••• does not 
111erely contemplete its objects es non-existent; it eontempletes them 
as objects which we propose to do something ebout." 20 tinally, will 
is phenomenal, uhieh means thet _it is governed by end subject to 
the laws or nature. Jones is confident that such en unde!standing 
of the will is consistent with the demands of natural necessity, end 
he therefore proceeds to discuss the adequacy of this interpretation 
within the context of morel obligation. 
Jones begins by noting that h011ever loosely one interprets 
Kent's ethics, it is et least certein that any ethical system which 
claims to be "Kentien" must contain the concept of the"!!. priori" 
charecter of the mot·el lew (i.e. that the morel law is both e universe! 
end necessary and for all men). Jones suggests that there is only 
one legitimately morel end which fully satisfies this critericna 
personality, itself. "Our eccount of e morally good eet of 111111 is 
now complete. Whet distinguishes such an ect, es regards its content, 
is thet it is the kind of eet by which personality is reaUzed." 21 
The ethical commend towards the fulfillment of human per$onality is 
universe! bec~use reason, es the distinctive pert or hur.~n personality, 
ls po~ses~ed hy all men, end it is necessary in the sense of "felt" 
necessity, ber.euse of the peculiar worth of reason. 22 
Thus, it is not from the concept of a rational 
being that 1110 should try to deduce the moral law, but 
20Jbid., P• 29. 
21lli.!i.•, P• 97 
22Ibid., PP• 80-85. Jones rejects the possibility of~ logically 
nocessery moral imperative. 
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upon tho velua (or worth) of such e creature that we should 
reflect if we would understend both tha Cfltegoricel form 
and the A priori end, which a~e the distin~~ishing cherac-
teristics of the morally good ect of will. 
With this definition of the morel imperative as the cetegoricel 
end!. priori commend t0111erds the fulfillment end realization of per-
eoneli ty, end 1111 th the concept of will es a phenomenel, psychicel 
event, Jones is able to conatruct e •critics!" theory of freedom. 
This critical theory is, according to Jones, not only e setisfectory 
resolution of the contradiction between natural necessity end morel 
freedo~ on grounds which eliminetes neither, but is elso "Kantian" 
in the sense that the theory can be found in Kant's writings in et 
least embryonic foro. The key question for Jones is, "Does Kent 
ever give en eccount of freedom which consists in saying that to be 
free ~eens to be moved by the kind of thought which we have just 
described?if 24 
This thought contains in the first place, the 
representation of a certain change in the stete of eff~irs 
es being one by msens of which personality can be realized, 
end, in the second place, the recognition that the worth 
of perecnelity has as an end in itself a sufficient ground 
for producing the change.25 
Jonas believed that he found such ~en eccount of freedom in 
Kent's discussion of the eutonomy of the will. This espect of the 
will which relates to its •self-legislating" function is certainly 
central to Kant's ethics, end Jones understands Kant to mean by it, 
the t the \I/ill is not only the means by which the mora 1 end is realized 
but is else the moral end itself. In order to realize this end, it 
is not necessary, according to Jones, the t the will be f-re o in the 
23
tbid., P• 100. 
24_1bid •, P• 101. 
25Jbid. 
sense that it is capeble or initi~t!~g acts while at the seme time 
being unaffected it~elf by previous events in time (i.e. it is not 
necessary thet the 11111 be "spontaneous"~• Rather, 
To call en act free is not, in e word, to deny 
that it is en act, for then, indeed, "e free will mould 
be an absurdity." It is simply e way of characterizing 
an important kind of practical thought which sometimes 
moves us. Pr3ctical thoughts ere, by definition, causes 
which are, without exception, the effects cf a~tecedent 
events in time. What distinguishes those which we call 
free is not, thorefore, the way in which they are causes 
er effects; but the kind of thought that they are. 26 
Hence, "freedom ••• is not incompatible with materiel necessity, 
because freedom does not mean 'not-determined.'" 27 At the same time, 
freedom understood in this way confirms the legitimacy of morel 
obligation which is both categorical end !!. prior,i. On this basis, 
then, Jones concludes that a successful resolution of the contradic• 
tion between natu.:-al necessity and morel freedom is, indeed, possible 
while still remaining within the general freme~ork of Kent's own 
philosophy. 
Thus there are not two different ects--a noumenal 
ect end e phenomenal act. There is one act {taken as e 
. sequence of events in time), which is through end through 
natural, end which differs in no essential way from any 
other causal series. But in virtue of being the particular 
kind of ect which it is, a value of a certain distinctive 
kind is realized ••• moral goodness, in a word, is just 
that kind of value -u,hich is experience~
8
whenever a certain 
kind of thought turns practical •••• 
And es it is the concept of freedom which gives 
expression to this value which reason has in itself, Kant's 
claim is essentially justified: it is precisely the concep~
9 of freedom which reconciles morality and natural necessity. 
26 
lbid., P• 109. 
27 
120. Ibj_Q_., P• 
28Ibid. --- , P• 137. 
29Ibid., P• 139. 
Despite th~ i nitial pers ua s i v~rss s of Jone~• argument, it does 
seem that his position i!! susceptib l e bl numerous objections. As 
steted earlier, Jone~ admits that the theor y ~hich he develops mith 
respect to freedom is "Kentien" only in a limited sense. Jones proposes 
that Kent held the ~freedom a~ fulfillment of personality" view, 
although he (Kent) espoused other views es well. Sscond, Jones 
contends thet his (Jones') concept of freedom satisfies Kent's own 
•Problemstellung." We shall not becaicerned with Jones' third assertion, 
that his interpretetion is a reesonably adequate solution to "our own 
conception of the problem" between freedom and natural necessity, for 
this issue lies beyond the scope of our investigation. However, the 
first end second of Jonas' assertions do lie within the bounds of this 
work end therefore require comment. 
Jones begins the deve lopment of his own view by rejecting the 
notion of noumena as being causally efficacious in the realm of 
phenomena. He states • 
• • • if q is noumenally caused, then x, the factor 
in the situation which brings it ebout that q rather than 
p occurs, is non-temporal. Therefore, though q is 9n event 
end occurs, there is no time at which x happens. But whether 
q happens or not is supposed to depend on whether or not x 
exerts its efficacious power, and this is really meeningless. 30 
Now, it m8Y be that efter e thorough philosophical enelysis the 
idee of noumenel causality is "really meaningless," yet e number of 
passages suggest that this (noumenal causality) is precisely whet Kant 
means. Kant writes in the Critique of Practic~l Reason: 
In the concept or a will, however, the concept cf 
causality is already contained; thus in that of a pure will 
there is the concept of causality with freedom, i.e. of a 
causality not determinable according to natural laws and 
30
Ibid., PP• 7-8. 
consequently not susceptible to eny e~piric~ ir.tultion 
as proof' • • • Noui the Ctl fi C9pt of !I bsir.s 1~h ch hes a 
free 11111 h that of e "~~ ~ru:?.U•" 
In Religion Within the Limits nf Reason Alo~e, Kant stetes, "To seek 
the temporel origin of free ects as such (es though they were naturel 
32 
effects) is thus a contradiction." 
It is clear that K~nt not only affirmed the efficacy of ncumenal 
ceusality but also thet he mas eble to allow for the possibility of 
events in the phenomenal world being the results of noumenal causes 
which are themselves non-temporal. Nor is this e "meaningless" 
assertion if one is willing to accept, es Kant surely was, that time 
is a category of cognition which epplies to appearences (i.e. phenomena) 
but not necessarily to things-in-themselves (i.e. no1Jmena). Kent never 
suggests that such ncn-temporel, noumenel causes can be "known," but 
this by no meane excludes the factual possibility of noumenal causal! ty 
which is ell that ~ant wanted to establish. It simply means that such 
causes con never be "known" in the strict senso in which Kent defined 
•knowledge." Therefore, it does not seem thet Jones• refutation cf 
noumenal causality is cogent on l<entian terms. The quotation from 
the Critique of Pr a ctical Reason is also evidence, contrery to Jones• 
view, that the will was not considered by Kant to be merely e 
phenomenal, psychical process which is subject to all of the natural 
laws. Kant expressly states the t the concept of the will with which 
he is opera ting is one of a will which is "not determinable according 
to natural laws." 
31 Kent, Prac t ical Reason, PP• 57-58. 
32 
Immanuel Kant, Religign Within the limits of Rea son Alone, 
trans. by Theodore rn. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (New Yorks Harper & 
Row Publishers, 1960), P• 35. 
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We must now turn to a cor.sic~.ation of Jones' ucriticel" theory 
of freedom. Agein, it would seem that this view is neither true to 
Kent nor adequ!lte for morel responsibility. \llhile it is true that 
the notion of autonomy (i.e. self-legislation) is et the core of Kent•e 
ethics, it ls not true that heteronomous action for Kent (i.e. action 
which ls not self-legislative end personality fulfilling) is necessarily 
un-free ection. And yet, if we accept Jones• view of freedom, heter-
onomous action must be un-free. Indeeq Jones himself states thisa 
The assertion of men's freedom is therefore not en 
assertion about the way in which certain events are caused. 
It is en assertion about a certain kind of value. Hence, 
•e may not say at ell that Cain's act of killing Abel was 
"free," since we can be reasonably certain that it ~~s 
note sense of duty which moved him to do this act. 
But what ere we to say of Cain's action? Can he be held morally 
responsible fer an act which is not free? Jones never ch~llanges 
the "I ought implies I can•: rationale, yet neither does he ever supply 
us with en answer es to how we ere to consider ects - which do not 
contribute to the fulfillment or personality and thus cannot be 
considered free. Kant hed no such problem for he saw both the autonomous 
end the heteronomous es expressions of a free, morally l'esponeible 
egent. 34 
On l:el.ance, then, Jones' view of freedom as the fulfillment of 
personality is unsatisfactory because it fails to fulfill even Jones• 
own criteria. It is neither Kantian in the sense that Kant espoused 
such e view; nor is it an ~dequate solution to Kent's "Problemstellung" 
because it erodes the very basis of moral responsibility: the ascription 
33 
Jones, morality ~.!l,d Freedom, P• 136. 
34 
We shall say more about this in our discussion of Silber•s 
view of freedom es spontaneity. 
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or morel pr:!ise end bleme. It ellnws us to praise but not to bhime 
by deFining im~oral ects e9 un-fra~ a:ts. To c2ll such a view Kantien, 
would be to fundamentally misunderstend the th:-ust or Kent's entire 
ethicel endeavor. 
The fine! view of moral freedom which we must now inspect is 
the "freedom es spontaneity~ view presented by John R. Silber in his 
essay "The Ethicel Significance of Kant's Religion.n 35 In opposition 
to Jones• st .rang refutation of spontaneous causation, Silber explicitly 
states, "Responsibility cannot be personal unless it can be concentrated 
in free individunls who can act without being determined to action by 
36 external end anteced~nt causes." And Silber takes this not simply 
es e statement or his own pergonel conviction, but one which is 
absolutely consistent with Kant's own view. He cuotes Kant: 
lllhat we .ilsh to understand and never shall 
understand is how predeterminism, according to which 
voluntary actions, es eve:its, have their d'.Jter1niriir,g 
ground in antec~dent time (which, with what happened in 
it, is no longer. within our power), can be consistent 
with freedom, according to which the act es well ea its 
opposite must be within the po~er of the subject at 
the m0111ent of its taking place.37 
f"reedom then for Silber and for Kant implies spontaneity (i.e. the 
independence of the will from external influences end antrcedent 
determine tion). 
~3 •e noted earlier, Jones• view of freedom precludes the possi-
bill ty · f' heteronom ,ous action being free action, because heteronomous 
action f~ils, by definition, to be a "personality-fulfilling" experience ■ 
Silber has no such problem. f"or him, "Heteronomy end autonomy ere 
35 · 
Silber~ "Ethical Significance," PP• lxxix-cxxxiv. 
36rbid., P• lxxxvii. 
37Kant, R9ligicn, P• 45. 
38 
the two primary modes of expressi ng t?"a:"l;c~cer,dentel freedom." Evan 
if one chooses to act on the basis of his strongest passion or desire, 
this is done, according to Silber, on the basis of the freely chosen 
maxim of choice, ~hich says thet "I shell act acco~ding to my strongest 
desire.• This ect, therefore, is spontaneous (i.e. free), and yet it 
39 
is not a "fulfilling realization of trenscendentel freedom." While 
hetercnomous action is es much the actualization of' transcendental 
freedom es is eutonomous action, it denies this freedom in principle 
by acting es if no such freedom were possible. ror exemple, an animal 
presumably acts, on the basis of its strongest desire. However, en 
animal, accor.ding to Silber, is not free. But, it is important to 
note thet the animal is not free not because it acts heteronomously 
but because it does not have a will which is free from external influences 
end previous determination. man, who is free, may choose to act like 
en enimal (merely on the basis or his strongest desire); in which case 
man l'lcts heteronomously. But man, even in acting in this way, never-
theless remains free because his ection is tha result of a maxim of 
choice, whereas the animal's action is not. Hateronany and autonomy, 
ere, therefore, both expressions of man's freedom. The letter confirms 
men's freedom by practically exhibiting its possibility. The former 
dsnies it by actin g ~.§. ll freedom 111ere not po s sible. 
With this understending of freedom cs spontaneity, Silber goes 
on to explicate Kant;s definition of the will. As one ml~ht expect, 
this definition is radically different from Jones• theory of the will• 
Silber states th a t although Kant construed the will as a 11unl tary 
38 
Silber, "Ethical Significanc~, 11 P• lxxix. 
39
Ibid., P• xc. 
-1a-
faculty,• neverthelos:s he thought. it helpful foi: purposes cf enalysie 
to distlnguiah three ~apa~te functions of the will. The first function 
af the •ill ls denoted by the wcrd, "Willk>.Jr~ i the power to cheese 
betw,een elternet.ives. In the fulfillment of this function, the will 
is e fecul ty of desire, 11 for Kant held that Wi 11 kut is determined 
according to the strength of the pleasures or displeasures it enticipates 
40 in connection ~1th the elternntives open to It." However, Willkur 
must not be understood es~ sort of enimal instinct, for this would 
deny the very freedom which Kant was attempting to establish. Whet 
Willkur does imply is that man's will is influenced by impulses end 
determined by the strongest impulse, but that Wlllkur is free in the 
deeision a~ to which impulse is to be the strongest. Only after this 
choice has been made can we say th8t man's choice is determined by 
the strongest impulse. Thus, Willkur does not deny human freedom but 
presupposes it. 
lllhereas Wjllk,Y,!. refers primarily to ths capacity of' the wlll 
to choose, Silber suggests "l:Jille 11 is introduced by Kant es representing 
. 41 
the "purely reticnal aspect of the will-" l:!Ulktir is free to choose 
those maxims which are in accord 1111th the moral law, thereby affir·ming 
its freedom, 0 1· to adopt other maxims inconsistent with the morel 
law thereby abnegating its freedom, but Willa constitutes the will's 
own demand for sal f-ful fillrnent. As such, Wille implies en incentive 
to wards self-realiz a tion, internal to the will. It is precisely .because 
llliJJe is a part of man's will, that moral experionce is 11atitonomous" 
401.lli•, P• xcv. 
t\1Ibid~ P• civ. ___ , 
in the sense that the categori~~l imp~rative is s self-imposed demend. 
The function of Wille, then, ls to provide 8n incentive to Willkur to 
adopt thees maxims which ere consistent with the moral hJi. As 
en incentive towards the moral l~•, the desire which Wille arouses 
in Willkur is described as a "moral feeling" which consists in the 
"simple respect for the moral law.• "The predisposition to personelity 
(~ille) is the capacity for respect for the moral lew as in itself a 
sufficient incentive to the mill (Willkur). This capacity for simple 
respect for the moral law within us would thGn bo moral feeling." 42 
~Ille, then, is a sufficient incentive to motivate Willkur to choose 
maxims in accordance with the moral law, but it is important to notice 
that Wille is only en "incentive." Thet is, Wille does not predetermine 
Willkur, which is always free to go against Wil l~ end the dictates 
of the moral lam. tinally, although Willkur can choose to ignore the 
incentive of Wille and fail to fulfill its own freedom, !'Jj.Jlkur cen 
never be entirely devoid of Wille for "when tha incentives which can 
spring from freedom are taken away, man is reduced to a merely enimal 
43 
being." Such a reduction would render mcral experience meaningless 
end is, therefore, unthinkable for Kant. 
The fin~l function or faculty of the will which Silber describes 
is what Kent dGnotes by the word, "GesinnY,!l.9,•" He (Kent) describes 
, 44 
it es "the ultimate subjective • ground of the adoption of maxims." 
f~innung is freely chosen by Willkur, and thus every man is morally 
responsible for his .Ges:i.nnung_. As the "ulUmate subjective ground 
42Kant, Religl..Q.!l• PP• 22-23. 
43 Ibid., P• 30. 
44.!lli., p 4 20. 
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of the adoption of maxims,• ~J.O.D!-i,,9 ie t he underlying mexim which 
promotes the choice or particul~r ~exims. Thus eny given morel ect 
. is treceeble not only to a "suparriciel" mnxim but else to en under-
lying mexim • In su fer es we ere eble to see beyond the perticuler 
•exims to the level of the Gesinnung, we cen perceive not only the 
~orality of the specific maxim but else of the underlying mexim es 
well. In the Metaohysic or Ethics end in the £rj.tigue of Prect!cel 
Reason, Kant analyzed men's moral experience almost exclusively in 
terms of specific or "superficiel" maxims. It is only when we come 
to the Religion and Kant•s fullest articulation of his understanding 
of the will that we se~ him locating the heart of morality et e deeper 
level, the level of Gesir.nung. This new dimension however, is 
extremely significant for Kent's concept of radical evil, as we shall 
see later. 
This then is Silber-•s view of morel freedom. He begins by defining 
freedom es spontenaity (freedom from external and antecedent causes) 
and from there goes on to present the process by which this freedom 
is opere tive throu~ih the compound functions of ths .,111. Any er! tlcal 
comments which could be mede about Silber•s intArpretetion of Kent's 
view of f r.sedom would lndeed be brief, because it 11ould seem the t 
his explication of Kent's writings, as far es it goes, is fund21mentally 
correct. However, Lewis White Beck in his commentary on Kant's 
C,r5.tioue f!.f....e.racticnl Re~~Q.il helpfully expands Silber's position, 
45 
particularly with respect to the interrelation of Willkur and Wille • 
.,. 
45 
Lewis White Beck, 
.fu!!!s9n, (Chicago, Illinois: 
pp.. 176-209. 
!L.,.C.p,mmentary on Kant• s Cri tigue of Practical 
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 
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Beck distinguishes between t~o modes of freedom, sponteneity 
and autonomy. freedom in the sensa of spontaneity refers to the operative 
functioning of the 11111 es WilJ kur. freedOffl in the sense of autonomy 
relates to the exercise of the •ill es Wille. Wille is always free 
in that its decrees follom from its own nature necessarily. This type 
46 
of freedom Beck calls "• freedom in the positive sense,• or autonomy." 
The sponteneity of ~illkur is "'freedom in the negative sense' or freedom 
47 
from nature." While Wille is always free, ~.1,llkur is not. In the 
sense of spontaneity (i.e. freedom from external influences end 
antecedent determination) Willkur is free even in evil actions, but 
Willkur cen be free in a wcomplete" sense only when spontaneity and 
autonomy join in e truly moral action. Therefore, heteronomous acts , 
era free, and Beck's view does not suffer from the same deficiencies 
as Jones•. But at the same time Beck's vieur has the virtue of accounting 
for the "necessity" of the cet8goricel imperative by showing that only 
in aiorel ec:ts can full freedom be realized. Thus man can be both morally 
praised and blamed, end yet the moral law is still the necessary 
condition of man's fullest realization of himself. Beck's view, then, 
does not contradict Silber's but amplifies it. The two, when taken 
together, accurately represent the views of Kant ~hich he developed 
throughout the mete physic of Ethic~, Cri tioue of _Practical Reason, and 
the Relig!.Qn.. 
moral freedom for Kent, then, is not a fiction; nor is it 
cafined in such a way that evil acts cannot ue attributed to a free 
end responsible moral agent. Rather, the freedom required by morality 
46 Ibid., P• 197. 
47ll,ll,.,c:t., P• 196. 
-22-
and consistent witn natural necessity sees man es a "£.ausa noumenpn," 
mhose freedom is sp,Jn t.aneous ! .n thg exercise of t«Jillkur and autonomous 
, in the decrees of ;1lil1~. man fully sctu-a lizes his freedom, however, 
only when the "obligation-creatingtt function of Wille is united with 
48 
the "obligation-executing" function of 1.1/illkur. Thus the categorical 
imperative is both autonomous to m~n end necess~ry for the realization 
of his fullest humanity. t.!Je must no11 go on to discover how Kant 
• defines innate, radical evil in order to see if it is consistent 11ith 
this ttnderstanding of morel autonomy. 
48rhe terms 'obligation-creating' and 'obligation-executing' 
are introdu ced by Beck in~ Comm0nt3ry, P• 199. 
II. RADICAL EVIL 
In his essay "The Ethicel Significance of Kent's Religion," 
Silber remarks, "So class then, in Kent's thinking is the relation of 
religion to ethics and so dependent is the former upon the letter, 
that Kant could scarcely have wirtten e book on raligion ~ithout 
si~ultaneously illuminating and expanding his sthical theory." 49 
This same point was made in our introduction and indeed the vital 
relationship between Kantien ethics and Kentien religion is basic 
to the rationale implicit in the purpose and methodology of this thesis. 
However, we must be c~reful to understand that ethics and religion 
for Kent ere connected but not identical. Kant, himself, emphasized 
this in his prefaca to the first edition of the Religion. "So far 
es morality is bas ed upon tha conception of man 88 a free agent who, 
Just because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned 
lews, it stands in need neither of the idsa of another Being over him, 
for him to epprehend his dut>•, nor of en incentive other than the 
lew itself, for hi ~ to do his duty.nSO Therefore, the first thing 
that ought to be noted about the significe ,nca of Kant's religion for 
Kant's ethics is th a t ethics is not dependent upon religion, end in 
feet, the reverse is much clo ser to the case. However, in the Religion 
and most particul ~rly in the discussion of "radical evil," Kant expends 
the ethi .cal. 1,ind metaphysic~! considerations aiready expressed in the 
49 
Silber, "Ethical Significance," P• lxxx, 
50 
Kant, Religion, P• 3. 
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Donald freeman has put it, Kant's "understanding of human freedom 
COffies to !ta fullest RXp1~9ssion iri hh doctrine of radical evil end 
is further illumined by his treatment of the biblical account of 
the fell." 51 We must n01,11 turn to an examination of Kant's doctrine 
of redical evil to find whethe.:- it 13 indeed the "fullest e:cpression" 
of Kant's understanding of human freedom or whether it involves the 
contradiction of this understanding. 
from Kant's earliest comments about radical evil, one thing 
is clears we must understand radical evil in such a wey as not to 
deny the reality of mnral experience. "man himself must make or have 
tnede himself into ~hetever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, 
he is or is to become. Either condition must be en effect of his 
free choice; for otherwise he could not be held respcneible for it 
end could therefore be morally neither good nor evil." 52 Radical 
evil, therefore, cannot mean that man possesses a corrupt Willkur 
which enables him to adopt only evil maxims because this would deny 
the meaning of morel experience, Nor, however, can man be said to 
possess e corrupt Wille. for the incentive towards fulfillment of the 
morel law. which Wille represents, is also a necessary condition of 
mor-al freedom. Therefore 1 since the sourca of evil, just as the 
source of good, must lie within the will, and since we hav6 eliminated 
Willlc:ur and WillJ! as potential sources of evil, the source of radical 
evil must be within the Gesinr1U!!.9.• Kant leys the groundwork for 
51 Donald Dale Fre9man~ R~dir,al Evil and Original Sin: Kant's 
Doctrine or i"~eaq_~in €xistenti a l Perspective, Doctoral Thesis for 
Dre~ Univer~ity (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, Inc., 
1969), P• 7. 
52Kant, B,ellgion, P• 40. 
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locetlng redicel 0 ~111 in illJ.!l0u nq by d:.'.scusslng three "pr:a.disposHions" 
implicit in men's nature. 
The first predisposition is the "predis~osition to animality." 
This predisposition manifest~ itself in man es the desire for self• 
preserve t!on, propage tion of the species, end community mi th other 
men (I.e. the social impulse). 53 The second is the "predisposition 
to humanity" which manifests f.tself es en inclination to compare 
oneself' 1111th other indi•1iduals and to judge one's worth end happiness 
in those terms. 54 That is, the "predisposition to humanity" represents 
e kind of social consciousness. The third predbposi tion, is the 
"predisposition to personality," which represents "the capacity for 
respect for the moral law as in Itself e sufficient incentive of the 
will (Willkur) ."
55 
Kant labels all three of thes ·e predispositions 
es original in man in that human nature presuppo!es all three. That 
is, e men ·could not be a man without possessing dl three of these 
predispositions. These predisposi Hons a re not only origina 1 in man, 
but they ere also good becausA they "enjoin the observance cf the 
law." The first tw~ predispositions (i.e. to animality and to humanity) 
can lead to vices: for example, gluttony and drunkene8s in the case 
of the predispos:l .ti c,, to e n::rnallty ond envy in the case of the 
predisposition to humanity. However, these vices ar.e not described 
t 
. 56 
as "rooted" in the predispositions but rather "gra fted 11 upon hem. 
That is, Blthough a vice such as envy can be traced ultim a tely to the 
desire to compare oneself with ot hers, which is the manifestation of 
53 
Ibid., PP• 21-22 ■ 
S4_It, j.d. 




the predisposition to hu~nity, envy !s net e necessery result of the 
predi!1posi tion to t,umanity. Thus, ~hile hc!1!8n n:!i ture presupposes 311 
three predispositions, the vices ~hich ars traceable to tha first two 
predhpositions ere not essentiel to man's ne ture. Therefore, they 
ere not described as "rooted" in hum~n nature, but rather "grefted" 
upon it. The predisposition to personelity can never le~d to evil 
since it expresses the very essence of morel goodns~s (i.e. respect 
for the morel law). In the sense that all three predispositions are 
inclined towards the good, in thet they "enjoin the observance of the 
lem" end iN the case of tho third predisposition in that it expresses 
morel goodness itself, man can be seid to possess an "original predispo-
sition to good.tt 57 In ~teting thet these predisp~sitions ere towards 
the go~d, Kant rejects what was then the popular notion thet the 
sinful is to be identified with the sensual. 
Kant, therefore, elong with Kierkegaard, "parries 
the rationalistic view that the sensual itself is sinful." 
••• Sin is not for Kant, as it was for Ritschl, "ths 
contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part 
of the world of nature and a spiritual personality cla i ming 
to dominate nature." ••• Certeinly the contrast between 
"'8n 1 s finitude and his rationality, his sensible needs end 
inclinations 6nd his unconditionel moral destination, is 
of greet significance for Kant's view of man end his condition. 
But 'this contrast itself does not make men en evil, a 
sinful being, Here again, Kant repudiates the stoical 
rationalism with which he ls usually charged. The valiant 
stoics, he said, were mistaken in seeing evil only in 
"undisciplined natural inclinations," where in fact evil 
is really "en invisible foe who screens himself behind 58 
reason end is therefore all the more dangerous." •••• 
Nevertheless man c~n choose to ignore the dictates of thsse predispo-
sitions end turn himself towards evil rather than good. And it is 
57Ibid., PP• 22-23. 
58Allen w~ Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), P• 210. 
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here that •e begin to 9~e the unfolding or Kent's under~t~nding of 
redicel evil. 
ror Kent, man ls confronted by e choice between b10 kinds of 
go-0~ both of which ere related to the three predispositions inherent 
in every human being. All three predispositions ere good, but men 
is said to be evil when end if he reverses the priority or these 
goods. That is, a man is evil if he adopts maxims which subordinate 
the incentive of the moral law to the incentive cf the "natural" 
impulses (i.e. the predispositions towards animality end humanity)~ 
Converse!~, a man is good if he recognizes the priority of the moral 
le11 end chooses maxims which subordinate the "natural" impulses to 
it. Once egain ~e need to emphasize that the basic morality of an 
individual is located et the level of Gesinnung. Therefore, the 
subordination of the natural impulses to the mo.rel law or the reverse 
takes place at this level. A man mhose Gesinnung is oriented to wards 
the adoption of maxims which affirm the priority of the moral lau1 
is good, and e man whose GesinrlUIJ.9. is oriented towards ecloption of 
maxims which subordinate the morel law to the ne tural impulses i!l 
evil. for Kent, there is no neutral ground; one is either good or 
evil. One either recognizes and affirms the priority of the moral 
law and is good or subordine tes this law to othar 1.ncentives ~,td is 
evil. 59 
Thus, we understand the meaning of the term •evil' for Kant. 
A msn is said to be "evil" when he subordinotes th € incentives of 
the morel law to the incentives of his natural impulse~ at the level 
of Gc:sinnung. 
59 Kant, Religi_on, P• 20. 
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~e cell e man evil, how9ver, net beceuse he 
performs ectio ng that are evil (cont rery to l ~ur ) but 
because these actions era of s~ch e n2t ure t hat we may 
infer from the m the presen~e in him of evil maxims •••• 
In order, then ~ to ce ll a man evil, i t would hevg t o be 
possible"~ orio r i" to infer from sev~ral evil a ct s done 
■ 1th c0nsciou3ness of their evil, or from ong such ect, 
en underlying evil maxim; 21nd f urther, from th i. ~ maxim to 
infer the pre sen ce in the age nt of an underlyi n~ common 
grrund, 1 tsel f a maxim, cf ell particular morall y-evil 
mexims. 60 
But Kent wished t o de more than define 'evil,' he also wanted to 
det1onstrate that this evil is "natural" in men, a c~ncept which is 
expressed by the phrase "propensity to evil." 61 A •p ropensity" is 
distinguished from a "predisposition" in that e pro pensity i~ acquired, 
whereas e predisposition is "given." 62 Again, this propensity to 
evil is located in men's Cesinnung. Although morel evil reletes 
to Willkur in that z men becomes mor1Slly good or ev : l only through 
the exercise or his active will (i.e. Willkur), this e ctivity is 
manifested in the orientetlon of Gesinnung. men's ~r opensity to evil 
is, therefore, acquired but et the seme time Kent d~scribes it es 
•neturel" or in men "by nature." To some, the ess e::tions that men 
acquires his propensity to evil and the t this prop e,:, si ty is in men 
•by nature," would seem to be blatantly contradict ory. But, Kent 
defines nature in such a way es to incorporate wit hin it the exercise 
or freedom rather then excluding it. 
Lest difficulty at once be encountered in the 
expression "nature," which, if it meens (as it ~suelly 
does) the opposite of "fr9edom" es e basis of ~c tio n , 
would flatly contradict the pre dicates "morally ~ good or 
e\fil, let it be noted the t by "ne ture of man" wg here intend 
only the subjectivg ground of the exercise (unda r objective 
60 
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morel lews) of rm'ln's freedom i v, ger.l'!l:~l, this ground--
whatever is its cherecter--is the nAcessery entecadent 
of every ect eo parent to tha sense~. But t his subj9ctive 
ground, egein, must itself ~lw~ys be an expres~ion of free-
dom (for other1.11ise the use or ebuse of m~n ' s power of choice 
in respect of the moral law could not be imput eg to him nor 
could the good er bad in him be celled moral), 6~ 
This means that the propensity to evil can be considered ss "belonging 
universally to menkind" 64 or "cen be predicated of men as a species,
65 
el though not in the sense "that such e quelity cen be inferred from 
the concept of his species (thet is, or man in generel)--for then 
it would be necessary; but rather thet from what we know of man 
through experience we cennot judge otherwise of hi ~, or thet me m~y 
presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even to 
the best.n 66 Kent sometimes refers to this prope nsity es "innate," 
but this is not to be understood es denying the feet thet man acquires 
his evil disposition. 
We shall say, therefore, of the c~aracter (good 
or evil) distinguishing men from other possible retionel 
beings, that it is "innate" in him. Yet in doing so we 
shall ever take the position thet nature is not to baar 
the blame (if it is evil) or teke the cr edit (if it is 
good), but that man himself i s its author. But since the 
ultimate ground of the adoption of our maxims, which 
must itself lie in rree choice, cannot be a f e et revea l ed 
in experience, i. t follows that the good or evil in man 
(es the ulti me t~ subjective ground of t~ e ~doption of this 
or that maxi m with ~e farence to the mora l l ew) i s termed 
innate only in this s ense, that it is posit ed as the 67 
ground antecedent to every use of freedom in experience. • • 
63.1.2iQ.., pp, 15 - 17. 
64 Ibid., P• 25. 
65
Jbid., P• 27. 
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Jbid. 
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F'lnelly, the ev!l disposf.ticn is termed "radical" precisely 
because men must beer the responsibility for its presence in him. 
"Hence •e can cell this a natural propensity to evil, and es 111e must, 
after all, ever hold men himself responsiblg for it, ~e can further 
call it e •radical' innate •evil' in human nature (yet none the less 
68 
brought upon us by ourselves)." 
Finally, we must comment on the possibility of a "restoration • • • 
· 69 
of the original predisposition to good." Thus far 111e have established 
tht!st 1118n possesses e propensity towards evil ~hich corrupts his Geein-
natig. However, since man is commanded t ·o e ttain the "good," it must 
be possible for him to do so, "• •• duty bids us do this (i.e. become 
d) d d t d d thi f hi h t d "70 goo , en u y emen s no . ng o us w c we canno o. There-
fore, there must be some way for man to reorient his Gesinnung end 
become morally good by adopting madms which effirm the priority of 
the morel law. Kant confesses that this is a problem which is not 
B8sily solved. "How it is possible for a naturally evil man to make 
himself a good man wholly surpasses our comprehension for how can a 
bed tree bring forth good f'rui t?" 71 Although he obviously did not 
feel confident that he had an entirely satisf6ctory explanation for 
man's moral regeneration, Kant did suggest that it must be understccd 
72 
es e "revolution" or "rebirth." That is, man• s Gesi~!)ll!l.9. must ~e 
6 8 .!.!llii • , P• '2B • 
69 tbid., P• 40. 
?Olbid., P• 43. 
71lli.,Q_., P• 40. 
72 
43. lpid .• , P• 
reversed from its orientation to1J1t'!rC-g the 9ubordinetion of ths 
morel lew toe new perspective ~h!ch recognizes the priority of this 
low. Kent views this revolution es b~lng of~eeted by the individual 
although cnce egain he admits his failure to fully comprehend the 
mAchen!ce of this self-renewal. 
This, then, ls Kent's explanation of "ra~iC1!l innate evil in 
hunian nature." Evil is freely chosen by man. Nevartheless, this 
evil is universal end thus can be predicated of all men. Through Willkur 
man freely chooses to orient his Gesinnung towards the adoption of 
maxims which subordinate the moral law to natural incentives• Thereby, 
man's will becomes morally evil. This evil, though "in human nature," 
is attributable to man's free choice end is, therefore, morel evil. 
Despite the possession of this "r~dical evil" man is comm~nded to 
follow the "categorical imperative" by reorienting his Gesinnun~. 
This can only be accomplished through e personal "rebirth." 
III. THE ISSUE Of RECONCILIATION 
As stated earlier, Kant held thet we ere obligated to do only 
what we ere able to do. Thus, the reality of morel experience demands 
that cnen is a free and responsible agent, 
• • • the morel principle itself serves es e 
principle of the deduction of en inscrutable faculty which 
no experience can prove • • • • · This is the faculty of 
freedom, which the moral law, ••• shows to be not only 
possible but actual •••• The moral law is, in feet, a 
law of causality through freedom and thus a law of a 
supersensuous neture.73 
In the first section of the thesis, a definition was suggested of this 
problematical concept of freedom. It was concluded that for men to 
be genuinely free, in the Kantian sense, his will must be viewed as e 
"cause noumenon," cap~ble of initiating events in the "phenomenal" 
world, while at the same time immune from determination by external 
influences end antecedent occurrences (i.e. the will of man must be 
spontaneous). Additionally, the categorical and"~ priori" status 
of the moral law requires that man's "fullest" freedom be defined 
not merely as the spontaneous exercise of Willkur but also es the 
autonomous dictetes of Wille. That is, men realizes his 11fullest" 
freedom end humeni ty when Willkur spontaneously chooses the autonomous 
incentive or Wille and rulfills the categorical imperative by adopt• 
ing maxims which are consistent with that imperative .. it of pure 
respect fer the moral law. 
In thE second section of the thesis me articulated another 
significant Kantian notions "radical innate evil in human nature." 
73 Kant, Critique of Practice! Reason, PP• 48-49. 
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Here Kent eppeared tn portray the universal condition of man as being 
ane of pervesive mor al corruption. Thet is, ell men heve chosen to 
subjugate the dicta c,es of the morel law to the dernands of the "natural" 
impulses. By insisting that this is e universal, innate end inextirpable 
condi tlon of wmn, Kant has been accused by some oFf81ling into e 
contredictfon whic h ls similar to the antinomy between natural lew 
and freedom. It is charged that Kent defines man's morel condition 
in such a way that he (i.e. man) is morally determined, end this is, 
indeed, es greet a p roblem for Kentien ethics es is the issue of' man's 
determination within the realm of nature. The task of this final 
section is, . therefore, to consider carefully the implications of 
both l<enl 1's definition of freedom end his definition of radical 
evil in order to discover whether they ere, in fact, irreconcilable, 
or whether Freemen i's correct in his belief thet "Kent's understand-
ing of human fresdOIII comes to its fullest expression in his doctrine 
74 
of' radical. evil." 
One place in Kent's discussion of radical evil et which it might 
seem that Kant is committed toe view of men which denies morel autonomy, 
75 
is in his treatmen t of man's "sensuous nature." It hes been suggested 
that bec .euse the ~sensuous nature" motivates man to adopt other 
incentives into his maxim than the moral law, it must be considered 
ee a predlsposi Uon towards evil since the morel la11 requires the t it 
(I.e. the morel law) be adopted as the "sole incentive." Moreover, 
since Kant defines the "sensuous nature" es e given part of men's 
personel.i ty, this nature must be considered as an orientation tomerds 
7'4 Doneld rreemen, ~adical Evil, P• 7. 
75
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evil fa~ which men is not responsible. Therefore, men is determined 
to be evil in that en essential part of his personelity ls, by 
7~ 
definition, oriented towards avi1. · 0 
However, upon a closer inspection of the text, it become~ clear 
thet Kent's definition of man's sensuous nature does not in fact 
commit him to this position of morel determinism (or perheos more 
correctly, morel predeterminism). The ovil in man is not the result 
of his adopting maxims ~hich include the incentives of the sensuous 
nature. Rather, it is the result of man's choosing to give , the moral 
law e lower priority than the natural incentives. 
Hence the distinction between a good man and one 
who is evil cannot lie in the difference bet~een the incen-
tives which thsy adopt into their maxim (not in the content 
of the maxim), but rather must depend upon subordination (the 
form of the maxim), i.e. which of the two incentives he makes 
the condition of the other. Consequently man (even the best 
is evil only in that he reverses the moral order of the 
incentives when he adopts them into his maxim. He adopts, 
indeed, the moral law along with the law of self-love; yet 
when he becomes aware that they cannot remain in a par ~ith 
each other but that one must be subordinated to the other 
es its supreme condition, he makes the incentive of self-
love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the 
moral law; whereas, on the contrary, the latter, as the 
supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, ought 
to have been adooted into the universal maxim of the will 
as the sole incentiva.77 
It would seem, then, t~~t Silber is right in his conclusion 
that, •many moralists and theologians have ~ought the condition or 
occasion of evil in man's sensible nature. Kant, however, explicitly 
rejects this position and argues that man's sensible nature, neither 
78 
evil in itself nor the occasion of evil, is good and worthy of fulfillment." 
76 
This opinion was advanced by the euthor of this thesis in 
an ea:diet' paper on this topic. 
77 
Kant, Religion, PP• 31-32. 
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Thtu,, if 111an•e s~nsuou is miture dr::ie,s r.ot contradict morel freedom, eny 
contrediction bet.,een Kant's doctrines of redicel ev 11 and moral 
autonomy must be round elsamhera. However, the seereh for such a 
contradiction ultimately proves fruitless, beceoRe Kent wes very well 
aware of the danger of contradicting himself end skillfully avoided it. 
This is not to say thet Kant's concept of radical evil or his concept 
or morel eutonomy is thorough! y se tisfectory ( we shell h!'!ve more to 
eey ebout this leter), but it is to sey that Kant defines these two 
terms, and particul~rly •radical evil,A in such e wey as to systematically 
avoid any contradiction of freedom. At every crucial point where Kent 
comes close to defining radic:81 evil such that e contradiction with 
morel autonomy would be genara ted, he demonstrates e cleer understand-
ing of this threat. At first glance, the introduction of the term 
~radical innate evil in human neture" seems to present genuine difficulties 
for moral froedom, but after Kant's defintion of this term is under-
stood, the difficulties are resolved. For instance, we generally 
consider something whlch is "innate" es something which is "given.'' 
Indeed, Kent defines man's evil es "innate" in the sense that this 
evil "is posited es the ground antecedent to every use of freedom 
79 
in experience." But he gives this definition only after clearly 
stating that tha evil in man is attributable to "men himself" es its 
"author. 1180 Therefore, man's evil is not "innate" in the "given" 
sense, but only in some speclal sense which Kant, himself, defines. 
And this definition precludes the possibility that "innate" evil in 
Men can contradict man's moral freedom, because K5nt mekes this 
79
Kant, _fuLlj..9:i.on, P• 17. 
innate evil in men the result of rnan ' s freedom (i.e. man is the author 
of it). Now, it is not clear hom men is responsible for this evil, 
tr the evil is "antecedent to ave .ry une of freedom in expElrience." 
Kant attempts to resolve this problem by stating that it is a 
•• • • contradiction to seek the temporal origin of men's morel 
character, so far es it is considered as contingent, since this 
character signifies the ground of the exercise of freedomJ this 
ground (like the determining ground of the free will generally) must 
be sought in purely rationel representations.• 81 Therefore, Kent 
believed that man could be held responsible for the evil in him, 
while at the same time this evil could be described as "antecedent 
to every use of freedom in experience.• While the adequacy of this 
explanation may be doubtful, nevertheless, the crucial point is that 
Kant defines 1 innetg 1 in such a way that it does not violate the 
concept of moral freedom by being beyond men's control. 
The same situation arises with respect to Kant's definition 
of "human nature." Rather than something "given" to man for which 
he beers no responsibility, "human nature" for Kent is, "the neces• 
sary antecedent of every act apparent to the senses. But this sub-
jective ground, again, must itself always be an expression of 
"82 freedom ••• As abov~, the Kantian reconciliation of these two 
epparently contradictory assertions that man is morally responsible 
for his "human ;iatu!'e" end that this nature is "the necessary antece-
dent of every act apparent to the senses," lies in Kant's insistence 
thut man's moral character does not have a temporal origin. Therefore, 
81 .!.!?1£!. • , p • 3 5 • 
82Kant, Re1igion, P• 17. 
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responsibility for "hum~n natur~" c~n b~ ~ttributed to m~n, despite 
the feet thet this netura ie nocesserily antecedent to evsry tempot'8l 
act. Again, the philcsophic~l effic~cy of Kant's defense mi~bt be 
called into question, but the salient point remains that Kent defines 
'innate• end 'hum~n nature• such that their definitioredo not deny 
the real! ty of morel eutcnorny. 
We conclude therefore that Kent• s definition of radical evil 
is not in feet contradictory with his notion of morel freedom. 
But this is net ell that nesda to be said about the problem, for et 
the same time that Kant qualifies his definition of radical evil in 
order to avoid contradicting moral freedom he atte~pts to do full 
justice to his notion of radical evil. Thus Kant scught an understand-
ing of radical evil which not only fail'S · to violate moral freedom 
but also fairly represents what Kant took to be man's unlvarsBl, sin-
ful condition. Therefore, if any criticism of Kant's two concepts 
is to be given, it ought to be centered not around the incompatibility 
of radicel evil and moral freedom but ercund thg adequ~cy of the former 
es e meaningful and cogent description of man's sta ta. 
However, before we consider the adequacy of Kant's doctrine 
of radical ~.tVil, \.Je must point out e possible contr ad.i.r:tfon with 
another of Kant's metaphysical po~tulates besides the postulate of 
human freedom. In the £:ritigue of Practical ReE.l.son, Kant begins with 
moral expsriencrf and derives from it the "£. prio£.1.it truth of the moral 
law. From the certainty of the moral law, Kont der!.ves three 
metaphysical postulatos: (1) human freedom, (2) the immortality of 
83 
the soul, (3) the existence of God. The argument for tha immortality 
83 
Kent, r;_ritJJJYs of Practical Reason, P• 126 and following. 
of' the soul is rother simple, Kent sugg E?sts that the ettainment or 
the highest good is~ necess9ry condition or the morel law. However, 
. the attainment of the highe s t 901:id impli e s as its necessery condition, 
the "complete fitness of intentions to the mol'!!l le••" Since, the 
attainment of the highest good is a necessary condition of the moral 
law, the necessary condition (i.e. "the complete fitness of intentions 
to the moral law") of this necessary condition (i.e. the attainment 
of the highest good) is else necessary. But, this •complete fitness" 
implies "holiness" which is unattainable in this lire. Therefore, 
the attainment of "holiness" requires the existance of an "endless 
progress to thet complete fitness." In turn, this "endless progress" 
requires (1) "an infinitely enduring existence" and (2) the "personality 
of the same rational being." Taken together, these two cheracteristics 
define the irr.mortali ty of the soul. In short, the i~mortali ty of the 
s.o.tU! i~ proved by showing thet it stands at the enci of a series of 
necessary conditions ultimetely traced back to the "!t prior..!," existence 
of the moral law. 
Houever, in the BeJigion and specifically in his discussion of 
Gesinnung, Kant suggests that there is a gap between man's moral disposi-
tion and his actions ~hich ar~ carried out through his "sen suous nature." 
That iss it' a r.i,m revers es, by a si r.r?l e unchange-
able decision, t hat highest ground of his maxh is wher eby 
he was an evil man, ••• he is, so far as his principle 
end cast of mind ere conc s rned, a subject su sceptible of 
goodness, ••• But in th e judg ment of men, who can appraise 
themselves and the stre"gth of their maxims only by th e 
ascendancy which th ey win over their sen suous na ture in 
time, this change must be r egarded as ng!hing but an ever-
during struggle to ward the better ••• 
84Kant, Religi£ D, P• 43. 
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Tha reversal of manJs .fillnnun_g_ from the propensity towa!'ds evil to 
en orientation towards the good is the key to mor-al goodness. It is 
in fact. the essence of moral goodness, for Kant. However, even 111hen 
this reversal or rsvolution is effected it somsho~ fails to menifest 
itself in , overt ecti.ons due to man's sensuous neture. Thus, man sees 
himself es progressing "toward the better," _when in the sight of God, 
he hes already attained goodness. 85 
However, this calls into question the entire notion of the 
connection between Gesinnung and action es it relates to moral status. 
Presumably for Kent, ections ere irrelevant to moral! ty because "good" 
actions can result from evil maxims. Therefore a man's moral status 
is entirely dependent upon the inclination of his Gesinnung. However, 
if this is the case one wonders why Kent thinks it necessary for man 
to possess immortality in order to attain "holiness." Kent's proof 
for the immortality of'the soul rests upon the assumption that since 
holiness is commanded by the moral lew, it must be attainable. But, 
since it is not attainable in the "world of sense," the immortality 
of the soul is necessary to fulfill the morel law. The key to this 
proof and its application to Gesinnung is the definition of "holiness." 
There '.'ere two alternative ways of understanding this term. The first 
is to make "holiness" synonymous with the concept of a "holy will" 
which Kant defines as a "will incapable of any maxims which conflict 
86 
"11th the morel law.' 1 However, if Kant intended to use "holiness• in 
this way when applied to man's moral development, then it would seem 
that the immortality of the soul is totally irrelevant to the attainment 
85 Ibid. 
86Kant, Critique of Preictical Reeson, P• 32. 
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of' such e stete. The ~ttainmerrt of "holiness" is represented es ~~ 
evolutionary process which requires an inf!nite amount of time to 
effect, thus, the nece~sity of the immortality of the soul. But, if 
"holiness" ls understood ~s man's becoming "incapable" of edcpting 
eny maxims which conflict with the moral lew, then whet ls necessary 
is not en infinite ~mount of time for men's morel evolution but rether 
e mir~culous event. To make man "holy" in this sense would require 
e supernatural ect which would change the essence of man's personality. 
At . times Kent comes close to suggesting that this is exectly whet is 
necessary, but if this is the case then there is no reason why the 
immortality of the soul is essentiel. The other alternative is, that 
Kent understands "holiness" as something different from a "holy will" 
when he describes ttholingss" as the complete fitness of the will 
to the moral le111187 namely holiness ls synonymous with tvhat Kant 
describes in the E,el,igion es man's ~1rebirth 11 or "re•;olution in • • • 
man's dlspoeltlon"(l.o. Gesinnuno). 88 Tfiat is, holiness consists in 
man's reversing his basic moral orientation from evil towards the 
good end edopting maxims out of pure respect for the morel lew (i.e. 
men's becoming morally good). However, Kant represents this "revolution" 
es e possibility and even e fact in "this life." And it !s precisely 
because this revolution ls realizable in man's mortal existence that 
there is e conflict between m~n•s interior goodness (i.e. in the 
Ceslnnun~and his actions. Thus, if the attainment of holiness means 
the achievement of moral goodness, .then the:t:'e ls no reason to posit 
~n immortal soul because men can evidently reverse his Cesinnung before 
87 Ibid., P• 1'26. 
88 
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del!lth end thus become holy. The only thing that is not perfected is 
the correletion bgtween Gesinnung end actions, which, causes men to 
see himself es progressing towards the good rether than elreedy heving 
etteined it. But, es we heve seen, actions erg incidental to morality 
end therefore do not effect men's morel goodness or holiness. If 
men's ections did effect men's Gesinnung then one could see why 
holiness could only be etteined in en after life in ~hich ~en is free 
fro• the limitations of the sensuous nature. But, since the external 
actions of the sensuous nature ere not influential or even relevant 
in the determination of m~ral goodness or holiness, then the rationale 
behind the immortality of the soul ~is undermined. By separating 
~orelity from man's sensuous ects Kent seems to contradict one of his 
three fundamental, metaphysical hypotheses, tha immortality of the 
soul. However, the immortality of the soul is not crucial for Kent•s 
ethical system es a whole, end therefore the alleged contradiction 
between it and radical evil is serious but not fatal. IAle must now 
return to our discussion of the adequacy of Kant's understanding of 
red!cel evil. 
[he first thing that ought to be noted is the means by which 
Kent establishes the feet of "radicel evil." Kent writes, "That such 
e corrupt propensity must indeed be rooted in man need not be formally 
proved in view of the multitude of crying examples which experience ••• 
89 
puts before our eyes•" In other words, the certainty of the existence 
of radical evil is established by experience. However, sppeals to 
experience or history generally demonstrate nothing more than personal 
89.1..E.llf_•, p. 28. 
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preference end are conclusive only for those ~ho ere predisposed towerds 
accepting the very conclusion under ccnsideration. Thet is, if one is 
inclined to believe that there is "!'ftdical innate evil in humen 
nature," then one will most likely see this belier confirmed in 
experience. If, on the other hand, one is not inclined towards such 
e belief, experience is broed enough to afford persuasive "evidence" 
to deny the existence of such evil. Of course, experience could 
never establish e strictly logical connection between "radical evil" 
end human nature. Kent saw this and was content with the informality 
end limitations of such a proof, " ••• even if the existence of this 
propensity to evil in human nature can be demonstrated by experiential 
proofs of the real opposition, in time, of man's will to the law, such 
proofs do not teach us the essential character, or that propensity 
or the ground of ·this opposition." 90 But it is not clear that an 
appeal to experience can be regarded as forceful even if taken as the 
most informal of philosophical proofs for "radical innate evil in 
human nature." Neverthaless this is the only proof which Kent offers 
on behalf of a view of man which proposes to locete evil et the very 
core of man's personality. If Kant had appealed to experience to 
verify the fact that men commit some morel misdeeds, then his proof 
would be more pela table. But Kant not only wished to establish this, 
but also that all men possess a fundamental propensity towards evil. 
It would seem that the establishment of this conclusion requires a 
91 
much more stringent proof than the one Kant offers. 
90Ibid., PP• 3o-:n. 
91 It is, however, possible that the general religious climate 
of Kent's time would have made the appeal to experience more powerful, 
both for Kent and his contamporeries, than it is for us today. 
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The f'inel point whii:h wa it.loul G l!ke to make 1111th respect to 
Kent's doctrine of radical evil raletes to it~ ultimate weakness. 
To say thet man is plagued by "redical innate evil in human nature" 
is to m8ke every strong and far reaching comment upon the nature of 
~en. Indeed, the alleged contradiction between radical evil and 
morel freedom is almost obvious if we take Kant's description of 
radical evil at "face value." However, as we examine more closely 
the way in which Ksnt defines the terms in his definition of radical 
evil, it becomes clear that what ~eemed to be a very serious charge 
against men's ne ture, is in fact little more then the mere recognition 
that ell men a~e immorel to~ limited extent. Kant writes, "Man (even 
the most wicked) doss not, under any maxim whatsoever, repudiate the 
morel lem in the mi:nner- of a rebel (renouncing obedfance to it). 1192 
And yet, this is prac.isoly whet m!lny thoologians and philosophers 
(e.g. St. Paul, Kierkega ~rd, Nietzsche, etc.) who hold to a view of 
men epproximating radical evil would suggest: namely, that the 
redic21l nature of ma n's s in lies precisely 11, the fact that he does 
"repudiate the moral l~w in the manner of a rebel ■ h Yet Kant felt 
it necessary to reject t his possibility becauso he was, as we have 
already suggested, intensely ewere of the possibility of violating 
his fundamental ethical pr esupposition: human freedom. ttKant, like 
Plato before him, explicitly considered the date which seemed contrary 
to his theory and, , like pJa to, used his theory to dismiss the 
contravoning evidence es illusory ■ He gave his theory momentary 
93 
support, but ha exposed its ultimate weakness." The ultimate 
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weakness in K!l.nt' s underste!"ding of radical avil is, the t for him evil 
is, in fact, neither redicel, .innate or e port of humen nature in the 
common understanding of these terms. Rather, K3ntien radical evil 
seems to represent en attempt on Kant's part to remain fa.lthful to 
the religious tradition of his time. But, Kant's basic concern was 
never as much religious es it wee ethical. And es it was clear to 
him thet e strong definition of radical evil would indeed contradict 
11oral autonomy, he qualified his definition in order to remove the 
contradiction. The result is e consistent view cf morel au t0nomy 
end radical evil, but one which does not do justice toe view of man 
which could appropriately be described as "radical, innate evil in 
human nature." 
~oral freedom, understood es the union of spontaneity end 
autonomy, and radical evil, understood as Kent defines it, are in 
no way contradictory. Nevertheless, the issue of their compatibility 
outside of their Kantian definitions remains en unans•uered question. 
And the consistency of Ksntien religion with Kantian ethics is not 
likely to be of great satisfaction to those who wish to take the 
notion of radical evil as seriously end as literally as they do tho 
concept of moral nutonomy. 
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